Competitivity in Auction Markets: An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation
通过多轮理论与实验室实验，研究价格接受行为和市场效率，分析结构参数和交易制度的影响，提出一种“仿佛完全信息”理论来解释竞争与非竞争结果。
We report successive rounds of theory and laboratory experiment investigating price-taking behaviour and market efficiency. We focus on the impact of structural parameters as well as trading institution. The structural parameters involve non-competitive supply and demand, and a new odd-lot trading procedure for divisible goods. The trading institutions include the continuous double auction and the one-shot clearinghouse as well as a new quantities-only clearinghouse (CHQ) institution. We present and justify an as-if complete information theory which explains the competitive outcomes and which correctly predicts highly non-competitive outcomes in CHQ markets.