Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach
用纳什谈判模型分析无约束合同时的投资、利润和工资，发现工会权力会降低投资，且股东利润总是更低，但工会福利在权力超过临界值时反而变差。
The paper uses a generalized Nash bargain to analyze input levels, profits, and wages in the absence of binding contracts, and compares these with the convenitional binding contracts model. It is shown that if the union has any power, investment is lower in the absence of binding contracts. The associated input levels and shareholders' profits are identical to those that emerge if contracts are binding and the firm acts as if it faces a cost of capital which is a linear combination of the purchase price of capital and the resale value. This implicit cost is greater than the purchase price, is an increasing function of union power, and is independent of the profit function and the alternative wage. Increases in union power reduce shareholders' profits but may increase wages at some points and decrease wages at others. In the absence of binding contracts, shareholders' profits are lower but there is a critical level of union power (depending on the profit function) such that the union is worse off if its power is higher than this level and better off if it is lower.