The City and corporate performance: condemned or exonerated?
质疑了关于金融体系差异的传统观点，认为主要区别在于所有权集中度和性质，并建议监管应允许公司选择适合自身的所有权与控制形式。
This paper summarizes the conventional wisdom concerning differences between financial systems. It argues that many of them do not stand up to close scrutiny. Instead, it suggests that the main differences concern the concentration and nature of ownership. Systems with high concentrations of ownership (frequently in the hands of families and other companies) may encourage more direct monitoring and control, greater stability in decision-taking, and greater commitment to other stakeholders than systems with more dispersed ownership. On the other hand, they are more subject to the private benefits of control and less flexible in responding to external factors. Different systems may, therefore, be suited to different types of corporate activity. Instead of seeking to impose uniform forms of corporate governance, the paper concludes that regulation should be permissive in allowing companies to choose their preferred forms of ownership and control.