An Empirical Examination of the Stated Purposes of Issuer Tender Offers to Purchase Common Stock
研究了1994-2006年美国发行人股票回购中披露的目的，发现不同目的与公告期回报显著相关，支持信号理论和自由现金流代理成本理论。
This paper documents the purposes of issuer tender offers to repurchase stock, as stated in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosures, over the period 1994‐2006. We explore whether stated purposes relate to announcement period returns and find returns are significantly lower when repurchases replace dividends, distribute cash from unspecified sources, or occur subsequent to third‐party tender offers. Announcement period returns are significantly higher when repurchases are viewed by management as the best investment opportunity available or when they occur subsequent to previous repurchase programs. Finally, we find evidence in support of signaling theory and Jensen's (1986) agency cost of free cash flow theory.