The Effect of Earnings–Announcement Timing on Earnings Management
研究延迟发布盈利公告的公司是否进行盈余管理，发现市场会预期坏消息，而延迟公司通过减少利润的应计项目来应对困境。
This paper examines whether firms which delay earnings announcements engage in earnings management. The cross–sectional version of the modified Jones 1995 model is used to estimate ‘normal’ accruals. Prior research has documented that, on average, delayed earnings announcements are associated with negative earnings surprises. Our evidence suggests that the market anticipates unfavorable earnings news when it observes reporting delays. As a consequence, late reporters appear to make the most of a bad situation by employing income–decreasing accruals in big–bath–type earnings management and in contractual renegotiations. We find that the magnitude of income–reducing abnormal accruals is related to the reporting lag.