贿赂与勒索:两害相权取其轻

Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

RAND Journal of Economics · 2010
被引 66
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

研究了贿赂和勒索对激励的削弱作用,发现容忍贿赂可能更优,但勒索绝不可容忍,为反腐败和解释发达国家优势提供启示。

Abstract

Both bribery and extortion weaken the power of incentives, but there is a trade-off in fighting the two because rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. Which is the worse evil? A fear of inducing extortion may make it optimal to tolerate bribery, but extortion is never allowed. Extortion discourages "good behavior" because the agent suffers from it even though he has done the right thing, whereas a bribe acts as a penalty for "bad behavior." Our analysis provides lessons to fight corruption and explanations why developed countries may have an advantage in dealing with extortion.

贿赂敲诈反腐败激励机制