Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
研究多单位歧视性拍卖，在允许非对称分布和非对称均衡的情况下，证明随着参与者数量增大，拍卖结果趋近于有效配置，并给出极限均衡的简单刻画。
We consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly for multiple units. None of the usual assumptions about symmetry of players' distributions over values or symmetry of equilibrium play are made. Because of this, equilibria will typically involve inefficient allocations. Equilibria also become very difficult to solve for. Using an approach which does not depend on explicit equilibrium calculations we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient as the number of players, and possibly the number of objects, grows large, and provide a simple characterization of limit equilibria.