Do Corporate Governance Motives Drive Hedge Fund and Private Equity Fund Activities?
发现对冲基金和私募股权基金的投资都受公司治理改善驱动，但分别针对不同类型的代理冲突：对冲基金关注无控股股东的企业，私募股权则投资于管理层持股低的公司，两者处理自由现金流问题的方式也不同。
Abstract We document empirical evidence that both hedge fund (HF) and private equity fund (PE) investments are driven by corporate governance improvements, but address different types of agency conflicts. Whereas HFs focus on firms without a controlling shareholder, in particular family shareholders, PEs invest in firms with low managerial ownership. Both appear to address free cash flow problems differently. Aiming at increasing dividends, HFs tend to use commitment devices that can be implemented over a short horizon. PEs are inclined to longer‐term strategies: they target firms that are particularly well suited for leverage increases because of low expected financial distress costs .