A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends
检验了代理理论关于管理者持股、公司杠杆与股利之间关系的预测，发现三者存在相互替代关系，有助于理解公司如何通过财务政策降低代理成本。
A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and CorporateDividends Author(s): Claire E. Crutchley and Robert S. Hansen Source: Financial Management, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter, 1989), pp. 36-46 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Financial Management Association International Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3665795 Accessed: 31-03-2015 15:42 UTC