Unions: Rent Creators or Extractors?*
建立了一个企业层面工会模型，整合了工会的租金创造与租金攫取两种观点，发现产品市场竞争促进租金创造，而劳动力市场放松管制则鼓励租金攫取，并解释了企业为何可能补贴工会。
Abstract This paper proposes a model of workplace‐specific unions that integrates two views of what unions do. One view holds that unions mainly engage in rent extraction. Another view holds that unions mainly engage in rent creation by providing agency services that increase workplace productivity. We demonstrate that the choice between the two activities is systematically related to the economic and regulatory environment in which the union operates. Product market competition encourages rent creation, while labor market deregulation encourages rent extraction. Moreover, we provide a rationale for why firms may want to subsidize unions.