明斯基金融不稳定假说的再思考

A Reconsideration of Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 2015
被引 82
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

研究了长期繁荣后投资者乐观预期导致杠杆增加和风险偏好上升,进而加剧经济下行时金融危机的机制,并探讨了不同监管政策对降低金融脆弱性和提升社会福利的效果。

Abstract

The worst and longest depressions have tended to occur after periods of prolonged, and reasonably stable, prosperity. This results in part from agents rationally updating their expectations during good times and hence becoming more optimistic about future economic prospects. Investors then increase their leverage and shift their portfolios toward projects that would previously have been considered too risky. So, when a downturn does eventually occur, the financial crisis and the extent of default become more severe. Whereas a general appreciation of this syndrome dates back to Minsky (1992) and even beyond, to Irving Fisher ( ), we model it formally. In addition, endogenous default introduces a pecuniary externality since investors do not factor in the impact of their decision to take risk and default on the borrowing cost. We explore the relative advantages of alternative regulations in reducing financial fragility and suggest a novel criterion for improvement of aggregate welfare.

明斯基金融不稳定假说杠杆周期内生违约金融脆弱性监管政策