A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems
刻画了哪些博弈论解概念会导致社会选择函数的不可能性结果，区分了仅能实现独裁函数与能实现非独裁函数的解概念，对理解机制设计中的限制有帮助。
For some game-theoretic solution concepts, such as dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, and undominated strategies, only dictatorial social choice functions are implementable on a full domain of preferences with at least three alternatives. For other solution concepts, such as the iterative removal of weakly dominated strategies, undominated Nash equilibrium, and maximin, it is possible to implement non-dictatorial social choice functions. Which aspects of solution concepts accounts for these differences? We answer this question by providing a characterization of solution concepts which lead to impossibility results.