Self-Selection and Optimal In-Kind Transfers
分析实物转移自我选择方案的最优设计，发现对转移收费几乎总能提高福利，而免费提供则难以改善最优线性税收；最优方案可能让中高收入者获得公共支出，而最低收入者选择退出。
With in-kind transfer self-selection schemes, agents choose between a set level of public provision or buy freely from the private market. Housing, education, and healthcare are often of this form. The optimal design of these schemes is analyzed here. It is shown that when a charge can be levied for the transfer, an optimal scheme will nearly always raise welfare, while freely provided transfers are unlikely to improve upon optimal linear taxation alone. Surprisingly, optimal schemes may involve high or medium income agents receiving public expenditure, while those on the lowest incomes opt out. Copyright 1992 by Royal Economic Society.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)