Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences
研究满足阿罗选择公理和不可行替代方案独立性的社会选择对应，发现对于任何此类对应，在大部分情况下，大部分人的偏好与社会决策无关。
A social choice correspondence is Arrovian if it satisfies Kenneth Arrow's choice axiom and independence of infeasible alternatives. For any such correspondence, there is a large fraction of the population whose preferences are irrelevant to the social decision in a large fraction of situations. The authors consider the case of a finite outcome set, and also an outcome set of positive but finite Lebesgue measure (in some Euclidean space). An unrestricted individual preference domain is assumed. The agenda domain assumption allows for a finite lower bound, possibly greater than two, on the size of a feasible set. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.