Bias and Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts: An Evaluation of the Impact of Auditing*
评估1989年加拿大法规要求审计管理层盈利预测后，审计是否减少了预测的乐观偏差并提高了准确性。研究发现审计显著降低了乐观偏差，但对准确性提升有限。
Abstract This paper assesses how the bias and accuracy of managers' earnings forecasts in prospectuses were affected by a 1989 regulation that required the forecasts to be audited by public accountants. Theory suggests that auditors' association with the forecasts would reduce positive (optimistic) bias, by reducing moral hazard. Regulators expected that the audit requirement would also improve the accuracy of the forecasts. Both predictions were tested using management earnings forecasts disclosed in prospectuses of Canadian initial public offerings. The results show that audited forecasts contained significantly less positive bias than reviewed forecasts, but there was only a marginally significant improvement in accuracy.