Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
研究一种公共品经济中的动态调整程序，该程序从初始禀赋收敛到核心配置，并证明在一般程序类中不存在同时满足局部激励相容和个体理性的程序，揭示了激励与公平成本分摊之间的权衡。
In this paper we consider economies involving one public good, one private good, and convex technology and propose an informationally decentralized dynamic nontatonnement procedure that converges in general from the initial endowments to an allocation in the core of the economy. We then consider a general class of procedures and show that there exists none in the class that is locally incentive compatible and individually rational. These results show that there exists a trade-off between the requirements of local incentive compatibility and equitable cost sharing.