Time for Me to Fly: Predicting Director Exit at Large Firms
基于自我决定理论，研究发现董事的声望、影响力和角色认同降低离职可能，而时间压力（如兼任其他董事或CEO）增加离职可能；公司声望受损时，董事离职倾向变化取决于原有声望水平。
One of the great unanswered questions in governance research is, Why do directors serve on boards? Drawing on self-determination theory, a theory of total motivation that combines both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, we find that the prestige associated with being a director, the ability to have influence, and identification with the director role make directors less likely to exit; however, demotivating factors related to the time commitment required, such as holding other board appointments or serving as a CEO at another company, increase the likelihood of director exits. Finally, we find that the value of being on the board of a prestigious firm diminishes when the firm experiences events that tarnish its prestige, although these same events decrease the likelihood of director exit when firm prestige is lacking.