Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes
运用激励理论分析计件工资方案的历史失败案例，指出在信息不对称且双方无法承诺未来行为时，任何薪酬方案都无法阻止工人限制产出。
This paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece-rate compensation schemes. Th e informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to i nstall piece-rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century. Th e formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commit ment in contracting. The main result is as follows: in a work environ ment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action, if neit her the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior, then no co mpensation scheme, piece-rate or otherwise, can induce the worker not to restrict output. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.