Managerial (In)attention to Competitive Threats
整合注意力基础观与调节焦点理论，解释为何中层管理者向上级发出的新兴竞争对手威胁警报常被忽视，并探讨高层管理者如何更好评估这些威胁。
abstract We integrate the Attention Based View of the firm and Regulatory Focus Theory to propose a model of managerial (in)attention that explains why appeals by middle managers for top managers to attend to specific threats of emerging rivals go unheeded. By acknowledging that different regulatory foci are elicited by different structural positions within the firm, we suggest that these differences in regulatory foci influence the allocation of attention to competitive intelligence warning of an emerging threat. We conclude by discussing how top managers might better evaluate whether threats of emerging rivals are worthy of deeper consideration.