Games the States Don't Play: Welfare Benefits and the Theory of Fiscal Federalism
检验财政联邦主义理论中关于各州在福利项目上策略行为的预测，利用美国1982-88年AFDC面板数据，发现福利需求对税收价格弹性不显著，迁移效应估计对模型设定敏感。
Fiscal federalism theory predicts that states will behave strategically in welfare programs because voter demand for welfare is sensitive to tax price, while the tax price itself changes because of welfare-induced migration. This paper tests these propositions on AFDC in the United States for a panel from 1982-88 using new models for the determination of the recipiency ratio (the tax price) and composite neighbors. The data do not support any substantial tax price elasticity of demand for welfare. Estimates of migration effects on tax price are found to be sensitive to specification. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.