Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee
重新审视1880年代铁路卡特尔“联合执行委员会”的经验，评估Green-Porter和Rotemberg-Saloner的价格战理论，通过估计动态模型探讨价格战原因、定价周期性和秘密降价的可能性。
This article reexamines the experience of the Joint Executive Committee, an 1880s railroad cartel, to assess the applicability of the Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) theories of price wars. After discussing necessary modifications to the theories, I estimate a number of dynamic models to explore the causes of price wars, the cyclical nature of pricing, and the possibility that secret price cuts may have been given. The estimates provide some support for the predictions of the first theory.