Delegated Portfolio Management and Rational Prolonged Mispricing
研究当投资决策委托给任期可能短于私人信息公开时间的基金经理时，信息如何反映在价格中，发现继承的投资组合会扭曲经理交易长期信息的激励，导致类似泡沫的错误定价。
This paper examines how information becomes reflected in prices when investment decisions are delegated to fund managers whose tenure may be shorter than the time it takes for their private information to become public. We consider a sequence of managers, where each subsequent manager inherits the portfolio of their predecessor. We show that the inherited portfolio distorts the subsequent manager's incentive to trade on long‐term information. This allows erroneous past information to persist, causing mispricing similar to a bubble. We investigate the magnitude of the mispricing. In addition, we examine endogenous information quality. In some cases, information quality increases when the manager's expected tenure decreases.