How private contract enforcement mechanisms can succeed where public institutions
研究在公共执行机构缺失或无效的环境中，私人内部自我执行机制如何有效替代公共执行，并以斯洛伐克糖业加工厂为例，证明其对交易双方产出和效率的积极影响。
Abstract The enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient exchange and investment in economic activities. Contracts can be enforced through a variety of mechanisms, both public and private. However, in many developing and transitional countries these public institutions are either absent or ineffective in ensuring contract enforcement. Under such conditions, private enforcement mechanisms may provide a suitable replacement for public enforcement institutions. This may be done externally through a third party or internally through self‐enforcing agreements. This paper analyzes the use of “self‐enforcing” arrangements or “internal” private enforcement mechanisms. Using a case study of an agri‐business in a transition economy — Juhocukor a.s., a Slovakian sugar processor — we show that the use of “internal” private contract enforcement mechanisms can have a significant positive effect on output and efficiency for both partners to the exchange transaction in an environment characterized by the absence or ineffectiveness of public enforcement institutions.