Competition, Wage Commitments, and Application Fees
解释为何劳动力市场很少使用申请费，通过模型分析发现，只有当企业能在工人申请前承诺所有未来工资时，申请费才会出现；否则不会收取。模型还解释了期刊投稿和大学录取中的正费用现象。
In this article, the author intends to justify the rare use of application fees in labor markets. He analyzes a model in which there is a training or testing period preceding a worker's effective production period. With various commitment abilities of firms, the author finds that application fees are used if and only if all future wages can be committed before a worker applies; otherwise, no application fees will be charged. The model is then modified to explain the positive fees in journal submissions and college admissions. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.