Top Management Compensation and Shareholder Returns: Unravelling Different Models of the Relationship
研究了美国制药公司CEO和COO的现金薪酬与股票期权分别如何与市场回报关联，发现现金薪酬变化体现企业间共性，而股票期权变化体现企业内特性，反映了不同薪酬成分中代理问题的差异。
In order to further examine the relationship between executive pay and company performance, this paper investigates the linkage between two separate components of executive compensation (i.e. cash compensation and stock options) and market return performance, among a selected sample of US pharmaceutical company CEOs and COOs. In the surveyed sample, changes in cash compensation were found to exhibit a between‐firm relationship with lagged market returns, while Δ stock option grants displayed a within‐firm relationship. The former result suggests a commonality in practices across all firms, while the latter denotes idiosyncratic firm‐specific practices. These contrasts represent different degrees of the agency problem in the contracts for cash compensation as compared to the stock option components. Levels of cash compensation were affected primarily by firm size. Market returns were not instrumental influences on the levels of both compensation components