Prospective Deficits and the Asian Currency Crisis
认为1997年亚洲货币危机的主要原因是银行体系隐性救助担保导致的巨额预期赤字，这些赤字预期通过铸币税或通胀税融资，最终引发固定汇率制崩溃。
This paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 Asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. The expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in Asia. We articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises. We present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis.