The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy
用博弈论分析国际环境协议为何难以实现完全合作，并探讨通过转移支付、制裁和议题关联等机制增强参与激励的设计思路，对研究环境治理和国际合作的学者有参考价值。
International environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma. Since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement, international environmental agreements must be self‐enforcing. Game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation. Therefore, environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers, sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics. Moreover, interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement.