Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance in Electric and Gas Utilities
研究大型上市公司中董事会构成和持股激励如何影响公司绩效，发现董事会构成与绩效无显著关联，而所有权与绩效呈非线性关系，且CEO任期过长（超过15年）会损害绩效。
We study how the composition of the board of directors and incentives from direct shareholdings affect firm performance in a sample of large, publicly traded firms. We use an instrumental variables approach that controls directly for endogeneity of both shareholdings and board composition. We find no evidence that cross-sectional patterns in board composition are correlated with cross-sectional patterns in performance. This result is consistent with a number of different explanations, all of which suggest that potential regulation of board composition would not be beneficial. Similar to the previous literature, we find a nonmonotonic relation between ownership and performance. Our results suggest that this relation is not a product of the endogeneity of shareholdings. Finally, we find that firm performance suffers if the CEO stays on too long (beyond 15 years).