The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited
指出交易成本经济学和产权理论对企业边界的解释存在局限，通过多个实例说明企业边界常由投资保护以外的因素决定，且激励投资的手段不限于资产所有权分配，呼吁丰富现有理论。
Both transaction cost-economics and property-rights theories offer explanations of the boundaries of the firm based on ideas of ex post bargaining and holdup. These theories are quite distinct in their empirical predictions, but neither offers a satisfactory account of a large variety of observed practices. The authors discuss a number of such examples, where the boundaries of the firm seem to be determined by factors other than the need to protect investments, and where other mechanisms than the allocation of asset ownership are used to provide investment incentives. These examples indicate the need to enrich their theory of firm boundaries.