A Two Stage Sequential Auction with Multi-Unit Demands
研究独立私人价值下两场第二价格拍卖的均衡，发现完全信息时可能低效且价格不变或下降，不完全信息时则高效且预期价格上升，并用事前竞拍者不对称解释价格下降异常。
Working within the independent private values paradigm, I examine a sequence of two second price auctions where individual bidders have diminishing marginal valuations. Equilibria are characterized for complete and incomplete informational settings. When information is complete, allocations can be inefficient and price sequences are constant or decreasing. However, when information is incomplete and symmetric, equilibrium behavior produces efficient outcomes and an expectation of increasing prices. These divergent findings are reconciled using an argument based on ex ante bidder asymmetry that can also explain the declining price anomaly. Finally, comparisons to other auctions are made in terms efficiency and revenue generation.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D44.