Ricardian Equivalence with Wage-Rate Uncertainty
研究工资率不确定时人们选择劳动供给情况下的李嘉图等价，指出减税的正边际消费倾向源于扭曲性税收的保险效应，并探讨保险效应与劳动供给扭曲之间的权衡。
This paper examines Ricardian equivalence when the wage rate is uncertain and people choose their labor supply. The author reviews the model of Robert B. Barsky, Gregory Mankiw, and Stephen P. Zeldes (1986) and shows that their finding of a positive marginal propensity to consume out of a tax cut is due to the insurance aspect of distortionary taxation. Then the author explores the trade-off between this insurance aspect and labor-supply distortions in the context of a model similar to that of Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes but incorporating labor supply. Copyright 1996 by Ohio State University Press.