The Employment Effects of Severance Payments with Wage Rigidities
区分了遣散费中转移支付和税收的不同经济效应，证明在工资刚性下两者对就业的影响不同，尤其当工资刚性程度内生时差异更显著，并用OECD国家面板数据验证了理论预测。
Firing costs have two separate dimensions: a transfer from the firm to the laid-off worker and a tax paid outside the firm-worker pair. To avoid the 'bonding critique' most of the existing literature implicitly assumes that, in the presence of wage rigidity, transfers have the same real effects as taxes. This paper shows that this presumption is in general misplaced, especially so when the degree of wage rigidity is endogenous. The predictions of our theory find empirical support in a panel data-set of OECD countries. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.