Appropriation of Common Access Natural Resources Through Exploration: The Relevance of the Open-Loop Concept
重新评估了开环均衡在公共财产问题中的适用性，通过一个自然资源勘探模型，发现当勘探动机源于战略先发制人时，开环均衡的效率会丧失。
In this paper, the open-loop equilibrium is rehabilitated as a sensible concept for analyzing common property situations. In a model of natur al resource exploration in which the sole motivation to explore prior to extraction arises from a strategic incentive to preempt competito rs, a consistency rule to the exploration game is applied under which the commonality of reserves is preserved even if strategies are open -loop. Under this rule, the so often claimed efficiency of the common property open-loop equilibrium is lost. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.