How Does the Allocation of Credit Select between Boundedly Rational Firms?
研究储蓄者如何在遵循简单定价规则的有限理性企业间分配资金，发现当企业回报率可观察时存在多重均衡，且资金充裕时经济趋近瓦尔拉斯均衡。
I study how savers allocate funds between boundedly rational firms which follow simple pricing rules. Firms need cash to pay their inputs in advance, and savers–shareholders allocate cash between them so as to maximize their rate of return. When the rate of return on each firm is observed, there are multiple equilibria, and some degree of monopoly power is sustained. However, the economy gets close to the Walrasian equilibrium when the availability of funds goes to infinity. Multiple equilibria also arise when there are “entrants” with unobservable rates of return. In an equilibrium where entrants are not funded, savers invest in incumbents because those entrants which will divert customers from incumbents are likely to be excess underpricers.