Shareholder Voting on Auditor Selection, Audit Fees, and Audit Quality
研究了美国上市公司股东投票选聘审计师的影响，发现投票公司审计费用更高，但财务重述和异常应计更少，为强制股东投票提供了实证依据。
ABSTRACT The Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP), formed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has recommended that all public companies be required to have shareholder ratification of auditor selection. Using data from 1,382 firms for the year ending December 31, 2006, we find that audit fees are higher in firms with shareholder voting on auditor ratification. We also find that firms that started having a shareholder vote pay higher fees than firms that stopped having a shareholder vote. In the second part of our study, we find that in firms with shareholder voting on auditor selection (1) subsequent restatements are less likely and (2) abnormal accruals are lower. Our findings are consistent with the experimental results in Mayhew and Pike (2004), and provide empirical grounding for the debate about mandating shareholder voting on auditor selection.