OPTIMAL PRICING AND QUALITY CHOICE WHEN INVESTMENT IN QUALITY IS IRREVERSIBLE
研究了风险中性的垄断者在面临未来需求不确定性时，如何选择进入市场的价格和质量，以及Stackelberg博弈中领导者与追随者的进入时机与质量差异。
This paper examines the price and quality choice of a single product, risk‐neutral monopolist who can delay irreversible investments required for market entry. It is shown that the price and quality she chooses at entry increase with uncertainty about the size of future demand. In a Stackelberg leader‐follower game, the leader and follower pre‐commit immediately up to a certain level of uncertainty. In this case the leader produces the higher quality good. When uncertainty is higher than this threshold, the follower will wait and enter the market later with a higher quality good.