Implicit Contracts with Heterogeneous Labor
研究企业如何为不同偏好的员工设计隐性契约，使得重视休闲的员工接受更高失业概率的合同，并解释低工资与高失业概率的相关性，以及平均工资随经济状态变化的现象。
The formation of implicit contracts in labor markets with heterogeneous employees is studied. If layoffs occur, the firm finds it optimal to offer differing contracts to differing employees, with employees who place a higher priority on leisure accepting contracts with higher layoff probabilities. The firm can do so without violating the constraint that employees voluntarily sort themselves into these contracts. Under plausible assumptions, the contracts match the empirical observation that relatively low wage rates and high unemployment probabilities tend to be correlated. Finally, an average or composite wage rate varies over states of nature, calling into question the ability of implicit contracts models to account for the constant, representative wage rate often found in macroeconomic models.