Repudiations and Confiscations by the Medieval State
研究了中世纪国王与臣民间常见的债务拒付和财产没收现象，构建模型解释其时机与形式，不依赖非理性假设，并探讨个人如何防范保护者的侵害。
Loan repudiations and property confiscations were common between medieval kings and individuals. Traditional accounts of these confiscations focus on factors affecting the kings, ignoring the motivations of the victims. This deficiency may be remedied by considering the problems faced on both sides of any agreement between a king and a group of citizens. A model is presented which explains the timing and the form of repudiations and confiscations without resorting to an assumption of irrationality by either party. It is general enough to address a persistent problem in the property rights view of government: How can an individual protect himself from abuses by his protector?