Deregulatory Forms, Variations in the Speed of Governance Adaptation, and Firm Performance
研究不同形式的放松管制如何影响企业内部治理机制适应速度的差异，并分析这种适应速度对企业绩效的影响，对关注制度变迁与企业行为的学者有参考价值。
Government regulation in an industry is an intermediary in the principal-agent relationship that acts as a substitute for internal governance mechanisms. We propose a model for studying how different forms of deregulation (frame-breaking, metamorphic, piecemeal, and plodding) impact variations in the speed of adaptation of internal governance mechanisms to the theoretical predictions of agency theory and resulting performance implications. We develop illustrative propositions for a set of contingencies that moderate the above relationship. How government and firms manage the deregulatory process has important economic and social consequences.