On the Riskiness of Universal Banking: Evidence from Banks in the Investment Banking Business Pre‐ and Post‐GLBA
比较全能银行与传统银行的市场风险指标，发现1990-2007年间参与投资银行活动增加了总风险和非系统性风险，而系统性风险无显著变化，GLBA后的风险降低可能源于样本期而非结构变化。
We explore whether an economically significant differential exists in market‐based risk measures between universal banks and traditional banks. Using a three‐asset portfolio regression model, we find that between 1990 and 2007—a period of gradual deregulation culminating in passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999—an increased participation in investment banking was associated with higher total and unsystematic risks and no significant change in systematic risk. Small risk‐reduction benefits emerged in the post‐GLBA era, but such benefits were likely the result of the particular sample period rather than a fundamental change in bank structure following the GLBA. Our results cannot justify the GLBA on risk‐reduction grounds, though the Act may be defensible for other reasons.