Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt, and Dividend Policies
通过联立方程模型，分析内部人持股、债务和股利政策之间的直接与间接关系，发现高内部人持股的公司倾向于选择较低的债务和股利水平，并支持修正的“啄食顺序”假说。
We examine the determinants of cross-sectional differences in insider ownership, debt, and dividend policies. These policies are related not only directly, but also indirectly, through their relationship with operating characteristics of firms. To distinguish these effects, we examine the determinants of the three policy choices within a system of equations. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that levels of insider ownership differ systematically across firms. Further, high insider ownership firms choose lower levels of both debt and dividends. Finally, the effects of profitability, growth, and investment spending on debt and dividend policy support a modified “pecking order” hypothesis.