A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling
构建了一个劳动力市场信号模型，其中信号传递两种信息，用于研究反信号传递（能力非单调信号）和GED考试。模型表明，反信号传递更可能出现在需要技能组合与学校教育不同的工作中，并解释了GED同时传递高认知和低非认知技能但不影响工资的现象。
We develop a job‐market signalling model where signals convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam. A result of the model is that countersignalling is more likely to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low noncognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages.