China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market
研究中国国企改革如何通过引入竞争性激励措施（如经理人竞聘、业绩挂钩薪酬）来强化经理人劳动力市场，发现改革后绩效差的企业更可能更换经理人，且薪酬与利润关联增强。
Recent reforms of Chinese state-owned enterprises strengthened a nascent managerial labor market by incorporating incentives suggestive of competitive Western labor markets. Poorly performing firms were more likely to have a new manager selected by auction, to be required to post a higher security deposit, and to be subject to more frequent review of the manager's contract. Managers could be, and were, fired for poor performance. Managerial pay was linked to the firm's sales and profits, and reform strengthened the profit link and weakened the sales link. Thus, the economic reforms helped develop an improved system of managerial resource allocation responsive to market forces. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.