Restricting the Market for Quota: An Analysis of Tobacco Production Rights with Corroboration from Congressional Testimony
利用北卡罗来纳州的面板数据，量化美国烤烟项目下限制配额转让的福利效应，发现无谓损失小但分配效应显著，并与国会证词中的市场参与者观点一致。
Regulatory programs that restrict output levels often impose restrictions on the transfer of rights to produce or to use particular inputs. In this paper, the authors use a unique cross-section, time-series data set from North Carolina to quantify the welfare effects of transfer restrictions for poundage quota under the U.S. flue-cured tobacco program. The authors find that the deadweight costs of such restrictions are small but that the distributional effects are substantial. The authors analyze congressional testimony on quota transfer legislation and conclude that their estimates of the distributional effects are consistent with expressed views of market participants. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.