名义不对称下的货币稳定政策

Monetary Stabilisation with Nominal Asymmetries

Economic Journal · 2003
被引 2
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

在新凯恩斯模型中引入信贷约束和名义债务合同,发现货币稳定政策对不同消费者有不对称影响,并推导出与标准损失函数结果不同的最优政策特征。

Abstract

Optimal monetary stabilisation in the standard New Keynesian framework usually assumes a policy loss function from outside the model. In this paper, in contrast, the objective arises directly from the model. Credit constraints and sticky nominal debt contracts imply that monetary stabilisation has asymmetric impacts depending on whether consumers are creditconstrained. The policy problem is to maximise some weighting of the expected utility of the different types of consumer. Features of optimal stabilisation are derived that do not appear to be far out of line with empirical evidence for many countries but that clearly conflict with standard loss function results. In recent years there has been a considerable resurgence of interest in the analysis of monetary stabilisation of output and inflation, in the wake of earlier developments in developing ‘New Keynesian ’ underpinnings for the long-unfashionable IS-LM/AS-AD model of the macroeconomy. 1 Although this literature has produced a range of both theoretical and analytical insights, it has arguably suffered from a rather deep inconsistency in its approach to monetary policy. Put simply, the literature struggles to explain, in its own terms, what monetary stabilisation is for.

最优货币政策名义不对称信贷约束粘性债务合同