Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting: The Endogenous Categorization of Risks in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information
分析保险公司根据投保人自愿消费行为进行风险内生分类的效率与市场均衡，发现这种分类能在竞争性纳什均衡中实现最优配置，并探讨了保费设计在纠正道德风险与缓解逆向选择之间的权衡。
The authors analyze the efficiency and market equilibrium of endogenous categorization, where insurance companies classify risks on the basis of insureds' voluntary consumption of products that are correlated with underlying loss propensities, and they show that the use of such categorization may permit the attainment of first-best allocations as competitive Nash equilibria. The optimal insurance premium involves a trade-off between the use of categorization to correct moral hazard externalities generated by the consumption of the product and the use of differential consumption to sort heterogenous consumers, thereby mitigating the social costs of adverse selection. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.