Federalism, Opportunism, and Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Agriculture
构建了一个概念框架，分析联邦制国家作为国际协议签署方时，联邦法律与各州利益冲突导致的谈判、批准与实施问题，并指出遏制机会主义是确保协议可信承诺的关键。
Abstract When federalist nations are signatories to international economic agreements, potential problems arise because of the inherent conflicts between federal law and legitimate state interests. This paper presents a conceptual framework for analyzing problems surrounding negotiation, ratification, and implementation of international agreements when federations are signatories. The economic model isolates three factors (the variance of state net benefits under an agreement, individual states' opportunity costs associated with the agreement, and state‐supported opportunism) as cost‐increasing impediments to the successful institution of international economic agreements and highlights opportunism containment as fundamental to credible commitments in international agreements.