Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector
构建了一个激励模型，分析企业、金融中介和投资者的财富分布如何影响投资、利率和监控强度，发现资本紧缩对资本薄弱企业冲击最大，但利率和监控效果取决于资本结构变化，模型预测与金融危机期间的贷款模式一致。
We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across firms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show that all forms of capital tightening (a credit crunch, a collateral squeeze, or a savings squeeze) hit poorly capitalized firms the hardest, but that interest rate effects and the intensity of monitoring will depend on relative changes in the various components of capital. The predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the lending patterns observed during the recent financial crises.