Time to Break Up: Social and Instrumental Antecedents of Firm Exits from Exchange Cliques
研究了1952至1990年加拿大投资银行团体中，社会相似性、凝聚力、角色互补性和结构洞不平等如何影响企业退出团体，发现互补性和不平等比相似性和凝聚力更能预测退出。
In a sample of Canadian investment bank cliques from 1952 to 1990, we examined whether social similarity and cohesion reduced exits of members from these cliques; whether complementarity through differentiated roles reduced such exits; and whether inequality in structural holes increased exits. We found that complementarity and inequality were more powerful antecedents of clique exits than similarity and cohesion. Our results suggest that clique stability is a function of three social and instrumental processes: building social attraction to govern exchanges, developing complementarity to accomplish collaborative tasks, and distributing the value created by a clique among its members.