Profit sharing (with workers) facilitates collusion (among firms)
证明在需求不确定的动态寡头市场中，企业向工人分享利润总能促进企业间合谋，提高预期利润。
This paper shows how profit sharing by firms with workers always facilitates increased collusion among firms in a dynamic oligopoly environment with uncertain demand. Expected firm profits are increased both if worker wages are tied to market conditions, or if workers instead receive a share of firm profits. We first show that firm profits are always increased by tying wages to market conditions. The optimal profit-sharing agreement generally features only partial profit sharing, because profit sharing raises the expected price-wage differential, but reduces price-wage variability. The attraction of profit-sharing agreements with workers is even greater. Indeed, we show that for any cartel size, there are always market conditions for which expected firm profits are increased simply by transferring some expected profit to workers, through the impact of this transfer on the incentive to cheat on the cartel.